

Algorithmic Game Theory

Summer Term 2023

Exercise Set 3

If you want to hand in your solutions for this problem set, please send them via email to anna.heuser@uni-bonn.de by Tuesday evening – make sure to send a pdf-file which contains your name and your email address. Of course, submitting solutions in groups is also possible.

If you would like to present one of the solutions in class, please also send an email to anna.heuser@uni-bonn.de containing the **task** which you would like to present and in **which of the tutorials** you would like to do so. Deadline for the email is Tuesday, 10:00 pm. Please note that the tasks will be allocated via a first-come-first-served procedure, so sending this email earlier than Tuesday evening is highly recommended.

Exercise 1:

(3 Points)

Have a look at the proof of Nash's Theorem (4.3) in which normal-form payoff-maximization games are considered. Let $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $S_i = \{1, \dots, m_i\}$ for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$. The set of mixed states X can be considered as a subset of \mathbb{R}^m with $m = \sum_{i=1}^n m_i$.

Show that X is convex and compact.

Exercise 2:

(3+4 Points)

Consider the local search problem *Positive Not-All-Equal kSat* (Pos-NAE-kSAT) which is defined the following way:

Instances: Propositional logic formula with n binary variables x_1, \dots, x_n that is described by m clauses c_1, \dots, c_m . Each clause c_i has a weight w_i and consists of exactly k literals, which are all positive (i.e., the formula does not contain any negated variable \bar{x}_i).

Feasible solutions: Any variable assignment $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$

Objective function: Sum of weights of clauses c_i in which not all literals are mapped to the same value.

Neighbourhood: Assignments s and s' are *neighbouring* if they differ in the assignment of a single variable.

You can assume that Pos-NAE-kSAT is in PLS. Now:

- (a) Show that Pos-NAE-2SAT \leq_{PLS} MaxCut
- (b) Show that Pos-NAE-3SAT \leq_{PLS} Pos-NAE-2SAT

Exercise 3:

(4 Points)

We define a Congestion Game to be *symmetric*, if $\Sigma_1 = \dots = \Sigma_n$. Let $PNE_{\text{Cong. Game}}$ and $PNE_{\text{Sym. Cong. Game}}$ be the local search problems in PLS of finding a pure Nash equilibrium of a general or symmetric Congestion Games, respectively.

Show: $PNE_{\text{Cong. Game}} \leq_{PLS} PNE_{\text{Sym. Cong. Game}}$.

Hint: Add an auxiliary resource for each player with a suitable delay function.